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BOOK REVIEW
FINAL JUDGMENT, by Dina Kaminskaya. New York: Simon

and Schuster 1982. Pp. 364.
MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN

In her book, Final Judgment, Dina Kaminskaya describes her
experiences as a criminal defense lawyer in the Soviet Union. Ms.
Kaminskaya was involved in several well publicized political trials
during the 1960's and spoke freely to Western journalists stationed
in Moscow. This involvement eventually led to her expulsion from
the Soviet Union in 1979. Given this background, one might expect a
political book highly critical of the Soviet Union and its legal system.
This expectation is only partially satisfied, however, because Ms.
Kaminskaya has not written an expose on the Soviet legal system or
an attack on the Kremlin. Rather, Ms. Kaminskaya has written a
book of more universal appeal: she discusses her background, the Soviet bar and judicial system and several criminal trials, both political
and nonpolitical, in which she served as defense counsel.
By broadening the subject matter of the book, the author tried,
I believe, to de-emphasize the political trials in which she participated. The first case she describes is a nonpolitical one, which she
refers to as "The Case of the Two Boys."
In this matter, Ms. Kaminskaya represented one of two young
teenagers charged with the rape and murder of a fourteen year old
classmate. The description of this case is the lengthiest in the book
and reveals a good deal about Soviet justice and the people who administer it. The investigation of the crime was badly mishandled
and, as a result, two innocent young men were brought to trial. After
two convictions and a rare third trial by the Supreme Court of the
Russian Republic, the defendants were acquitted. The description of
the case serves as a convenient showcase for Ms. Kaminskaya's considerable skills as an advocate and for her view that "the judicial
system in the Soviet Union does work," a somewhat startling conclusion in light of her experiences as a defense attorney in political
trials.
The section of the book recounting her political cases starts with
a somewhat perplexing account of her involvement in the defense of

338

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Yulii Daniel who, along with Andrei Sinyavsky, was charged with
spreading anti-Soviet propaganda in violation of the criminal code.
The defendants had published works of fiction outside of the Soviet
Union without official permission. This seemingly blameless conduct
was, in the mid-1960's, of considerable significance because it represented an act of open defiance, unknown prior to Stalin's death in
1953 and rare in the interim. Since the objectionable manuscripts
were fictional, the defendants' moral position was unassailable, especially in literary circles. Thus, the Sinyavsky-Daniel case became a
cause celebre both within and outside of the Soviet Union.
Ms. Kaminskaya reveals that even before she was asked to represent Daniel, the morality of his actions appealed to her. Of equal
importance, she believed that his conduct was clearly legal. Neither
she, nor her husband (also a lawyer), hesitated when asked to represent the defendants. Her husband was, however, denied "access,"
which means that the Communist Party would not grant him the
privilege of representing political defendants. She then became
Daniel's attorney, but was somehow removed from the representation on the eve of trial. She describes how she was pressured to withdraw from the case, her resistance to that pressure and her resentment against the responsible individual. She does not, however, tell
us why, or exactly how, she was removed from the case. In any
event, the removal was apparently against her will.
The Sinyavsky-Daniel case was the author's earliest experience
in a political case and that is probably why she discusses it first. It
turns out, in retrospect, that the Sinyavsky-Daniel case is logically
discussed first for another reason: it is the least shocking of the injustices the author recounts in her political trials. Denying a person the
counsel of his choosing is a mild injustice compared to the abuses the
author found in her later cases.
Her first client in a political trial was Vladimir Bukovsky, who
has since gained fame in the West. Bukovsky and several others took
part in a peaceful public demonstration protesting the imprisonment
of certain Soviet dissidents. Like the Sinyavsky-Daniel case, this case
had a great deal of appeal. The defendants planned a peaceful and
lawful demonstration; if the defendants were found guilty, then any
public demonstration could be found unlawful. Since this conclusion
ran contrary to Ms. Kaminskaya's understanding of the law, she
strongly believed in her client's case. Nevertheless, Bukovsky and his
co-defendants were all found guilty. Bukovsky was imprisoned; his
two co-defendants were given suspended sentences and released. This
sentence, Ms. Kaminskaya observes (speculates?), was dictated to
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the court by the highest authorities in the Communist Party with the
approval of the KGB.
In recounting the Bukovsky trial and other trials, Ms. Kaminskaya describes the coercive interrogation of defendants by prosecutors, the prejudice of the judges against the defendants, the falsification of transcripts, judicial acquiescence and complicity in perjury,
and the subservience of the judiciary and the prosecution to the dictates of the Communist Party. She seemed convinced that the outcome of each political case, including the sentences for the defendants, was decided by the Communist Party before the trial began
and, for various reasons, the presiding trial judge and appellate
judges dutifully followed those dictates. If Ms. Kaminskaya truly believed this (and there is no reason to doubt it), one wonders how she
could have any respect for the Soviet judicial system or why she
would willingly participate in political trials. I find this latter question most intriguing, particularly because these political cases appeared to be very arduous and frought with risk for the lawyer who
offended the Communist Party in the course of the trial. Ms. Kaminskaya suggests at one point that she represented dissidents out of a sense of professional responsibility. Undoubtedly
more was involved, because a sense of professional responsibility
might also compel one to refuse to participate in a case in which the
outcome was predetermined. Despite her protestations to the contrary, I suspect that Ms. Kaminskaya possessed a bit of the dissident
spirit herself. She represented the dissidents, despite the hardships,
for the same reason the dissidents defied Soviet authorities and were
willing to pay the very onerous consequences: in each case the individual's morality compelled the action. Just as Vladimir Bukovsky
could not remain silent when his colleagues were imprisoned, and
Larisa Bogoraz had to voice objection to the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia, Ms. Kaminskaya's morality obligated her to take up
the defense of these dissidents. She admits as much when she says,
early in the book:
The Soviet dissidents whom I defended were neither terrorists nor extremists. They were people struggling, within
the law, to induce the state to observe legitimate human
rights. I believed they were fighting, openly and from a sense
of duty, for something that we lawyers must fight for in the
very nature of our profession. In defending them I felt that I
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too was in some degree taking part in that struggle.'
Later in the book, when reflecting on her career, Ms. Kaminskaya is
more militant:
I believe the greatest evils in these post-Stalin years are perpetrated not by villains and hatchetmen but by collaborators
'and appeasers. The psychiatrists, for instance, who subject
sane people to torture by psychiatry are probably not sadists
with an irresistible urge to make people suffer. They are simply in a position where they either obey orders or are fired.
Judges are faced with the same choice. All of us - lawyers,
judges, doctors - have chosen professions that give us the
right to make decisions affecting the fate of our fellow
human beings. And if we neglect our professional duty to the
detriment of those who are dependent upon us, we should not
2
be in the profession.
The line is thus drawn. Within the Soviet system, those who act out
of a sense of morality pass the line and are dissidents.
In representing dissidents, Ms. Kaminskaya answered the highest calling of our profession. She worked tirelessly in their defense
because she felt it was their due. If the Party was intent on convicting them, so be it. But before the verdict was announced, she was
determined to prove to those present, whether the trial was open to
the public or not, that her clients deserved to be acquitted. The record would be made. She could do no more.
Final Judgment is not a great book. It is not well written and
contains little beyond the author's recollections and observations. At
the same time, however, it is a marvelous story of courage, duty and
morality. It serves as an important compliment to the literature of
Soviet dissidents, providing insight into the judicial process that led
to their incarcerations. Finally, the book is an inspirational account
of a lawyer's practice. The reader is left with a deep respect for the
author's devotion to our profession and for the role lawyers can play
even under the most adverse of circumstances.

I. D. KAMINSKAYA,
2.
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